Who is More Free? A Comparison of the Decision-Making of Private and Public School Principals by Shakeel, M. Danish & DeAngelis, Corey A.
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville 
ScholarWorks@UARK 
Education Reform Faculty and Graduate 
Students Publications Education Reform 
1-24-2017 
Who is More Free? A Comparison of the Decision-Making of 
Private and Public School Principals 
M. Danish Shakeel 
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, mdshakee@uark.edu 
Corey A. DeAngelis 
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/edrepub 
 Part of the Educational Assessment, Evaluation, and Research Commons, Educational Leadership 
Commons, and the Other Educational Administration and Supervision Commons 
Citation 
Shakeel, M. D., & DeAngelis, C. A. (2017). Who is More Free? A Comparison of the Decision-Making of 
Private and Public School Principals. Education Reform Faculty and Graduate Students Publications. 
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.uark.edu/edrepub/31 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Education Reform at ScholarWorks@UARK. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Education Reform Faculty and Graduate Students Publications by an authorized 
administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact ccmiddle@uark.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
Who is More Free? A Comparison of the Decision-Making of Private and 
Public School Principals 
 
M. Danish Shakeel 
Corey A. DeAngelis 
 
 
Last Revised: January 24, 2017 
 
EDRE Working Paper 2016-09 
 
 
 
 
The University of Arkansas, Department of Education Reform (EDRE) working paper series is 
intended to widely disseminate and make easily accessible the results of EDRE faculty and 
students’ latest findings. The Working Papers in this series have not undergone peer review or 
been edited by the University of Arkansas. The working papers are widely available, to 
encourage discussion and input from the research community before publication in a formal, peer 
reviewed journal. Unless otherwise indicated, working papers can be cited without permission of 
the author so long as the source is clearly referred to as an EDRE working paper.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2795138
WHO IS MORE FREE?  
1 
 
 
 
WHO IS MORE FREE? A COMPARISON OF THE DECISION-MAKING OF PRIVATE 
AND PUBLIC SCHOOL PRINCIPALS 
 
 
 
 
 
M. Danish Shakeel 
Department of Education Reform, 
University of Arkansas 
mdshakee@uark.edu 
 
 
Corey A. DeAngelis 
Department of Education Reform, 
University of Arkansas 
cadeange@uark.edu 
 
 
January 24, 2017 
 
 
School Choice Demonstration Project,  
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
The content of the report is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily 
represent the views of the University of Arkansas.  Corresponding author is M. Danish Shakeel, 
mdshakee@uark.edu. 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2795138
WHO IS MORE FREE?  
2 
 
Abstract 
While an abundance of school choice literature focuses on student achievement 
outcomes, little has been done to determine the mechanisms involved in producing such 
outcomes.  We present a comparative analysis of private and public school principals using data 
from the School and Staffing Survey (SASS) 2011-2012.  We add to the literature by examining 
the differences in private and public school principals’ abilities to influence important decisions 
at their schools.  We conclude that private schooling may have a systematic advantage over 
public schooling since private school leadership exhibits more autonomy in influencing relevant 
decisions. 
Keywords: school choice; school leadership; school management; School and Staffing 
Survey 
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Introduction 
“While the public school principal is bound most by red tape, the private school 
principal is bound most by his or her conscience.” 
—John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, 1988, p. 1076 
School choice has emerged as a key intervention in school reform globally.  In fact, the 
United States President-Elect, Donald Trump, promised massive expansion of private school 
choice through a reallocation of $20 billion in federal funding in 2017.  Evidence suggests that 
private schools slightly outperform public schools on improving student achievement within the 
US as well as internationally (Betts & Tang, 2011; Forster, 2016; Greene, 2005; Shakeel, 
Anderson, & Wolf, 2016; Tooley, 2005; Tooley, Bao, Dixon, & Merrifield, 2011).  Most of the 
school choice studies focus on student achievement (West & Woessmann, 2010; Witte, 2001; 
Witte et al., 2014; Wolf et al., 2013).  Out of the nineteen experimental studies of private school 
choice in the United States, the only negative findings for test scores were from the two studies 
of the Louisiana Scholarship Program (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Walters, 2015; Mills & Wolf, 
2016).   
Other studies have examined impacts on the long-term outcomes of students such as 
attainment (Booker et al., 2008; Zimmer, 2009; Cowen et al., 2013; Wolf et al., 2013) and 
criminal activity (Deming, 2011; Dobbie & Fryer, 2015; DeAngelis & Wolf, 2016).  While this 
evidence is limited, the existing studies have found that access to school choice reduces criminal 
activity and teen pregnancy while increasing the likelihood of graduating from high school.  
Additionally, access to private school choice may increase performance in public schools 
through competitive effects (Egalite, 2013; Egalite, 2016; Figlio & Hart, 2014; Greene & 
Winters, 2003; Sandström & Bergström, 2005) and increase civic skills such as voter activity, 
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volunteering, charitable activity, and tolerance of others (Campbell, 2002; Bettinger & Slonim, 
2006; Fleming, 2014; Fleming, Mitchell, & McNally, 2014). 
Though many studies have examined whether private schools outperform public schools, 
few have looked at why there are differences in short and long-term student outcomes.  Wolf and 
Hoople (2006) attempted to peer into the black box of the school choice reform through 
examination of the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program and found that the successful private 
schools allocated fewer resources to facilities and programs.  Our study fits into the literature by 
examining a potential explanation for why school choice could have an advantage in producing 
slightly positive outcomes for students.   
We examine the differences in the autonomy of school leaders, which may increase the 
likelihood that leaders can adapt to the changing needs of students and staff within their schools.  
Effective leadership, and an environment to support the ability to make effective decisions within 
a school, may be important for creating a high-quality educational experience for children 
(Rousmaniere, 2013).  For example, Grissom, Loeb and Master (2013) find that principals that 
can spend time on things such as the school’s education curriculum can positively influence 
student achievement.  Conversely, they find that principals that spend more time on activities 
such as simple classroom walkthroughs may have a negative impact on student growth.  
Additionally, Ouchi (2009) and Hess (2013) point out that student learning cannot be improved 
unless school leaders have control over important school-level activities such as curriculum and 
the budget. 
In schooling, leaders that are free to influence important decisions may be better able to 
change their approach to curriculum, instruction, or professional development practices if their 
leaders notice inefficiencies (Tekleselassie & Villarreal III, 2011).  However, schools with 
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constrained leadership will be less likely to capitalize on the benefits associated with needed 
reform strategies.  Branch, Hanushek and Rivkin (2013) point out that highly effective principals 
increase student learning by two to seven months within a single school year. Chubb and Moe 
(1988, p. 1065) found that the public and private schools were “distinctively different in 
environment and organization” and that private school principals had more teaching experience 
than public school principals. They also theorized that greater autonomy would exist in private 
schools with respect to their structure, goals and school operations.  However, Chubb and Moe 
did not empirically test this specific theory. 
We provide the first study to empirically test the hypothesis that the private schooling 
sector allows for more leadership autonomy by using nationally representative survey data of 
principals in the United States for the 2011-12 school year from the School and Staffing Survey. 
We compare the reported differences between public and private school principals’ influence on 
decision-making activities within their schools.  Since we simply want to make overall 
comparisons between the two types of institutions, we do not examine subcategories of private 
schools and public schools. 
Theory 
In private schools, families have lower transaction costs associated with opting to leave 
the school, making the school operators more prone to the threat of a shutdown condition 
(Friedman, 1955; West, 1981). However, loss for a private school is not only monetary in the 
short-run; it can also cause several chain reactions such as damaged brand name, threat to 
teachers’ jobs, and threat of change in the perception of future clients.  Since families are more 
able to leave the private school if they are dissatisfied, it is more necessary for the school leader 
to be able to make changes to influence customer satisfaction levels (Smith, 1776; West, 1997).  
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If a private school principal is able to make the decisions necessary to adapt to the signals 
transmitted by his or her clients, the quality of their schooling should increase.  Since the public 
school often has a monopoly on public funding, and their customers are assigned residentially, 
their leaders do not need to adapt to dissatisfaction as quickly (Hoxby, 2007; Peterson, 1998; 
Peterson & Hassel, 1998).  In other words, the transaction costs for a customer leaving a public 
school are much higher, especially since it would require Tiebout choice (Tiebout, 1956) or 
paying for a private school out of pocket (Friedman & Friedman, 1990; Merrifield, 2008).  
In fact, since the transaction costs are typically much higher in order to exit a public 
school, large amounts of principal autonomy may not be desirable in that sector (Neal, 2002).  If 
a malicious, or simply ineffective, principal becomes the leader of the school, we may not want 
them making school-level decisions that could negatively affect students (Hayek, 2011).  If the 
ineffective principal is free to make bad decisions, many students may be harmed without much 
of an exit option, especially if they come from a disadvantaged family (Gaventa, 1982; Lerner, 
1995).  Since this scenario is potentially more likely and costly in public institutions, the public 
sector may be more likely to be set up in a way to limit the possibility of this negative event 
occurring.  As a result, an official from the central office may be more likely to control the 
important school-level decisions. 
The private school principal is likely to have more influence in decision-making since the 
private schools have fewer political constraints and enjoy more autonomy in selection of students 
and daily administration than public schools (Firestone & Shipps, 2005; Shipps & White, 2009; 
White, 2006).  Since private school principal are at least less likely to feel the pressures of 
political constraints, they may feel more confident and able to influence school-level activities.  
Private school leaders may be more likely to establish an environment of similar students 
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working towards a uniform mission through selective-admissions and an improved match 
between school goals and student interests. 
Additionally, private school principals may face a stronger dismissal threat than their 
public school counterparts.  If school leaders have fewer costs associated with dismissing their 
principals, they will be more likely to be able to hold them accountable for their actions.  If a 
private school principal can be dismissed easily, they will have a stronger incentive to make 
effective decisions.  On the other hand, if a school principal is protected through unionization or 
otherwise, they will be more likely to make ineffective decisions without the same level of 
accountability (Chubb & Moe, 1986; Painter, 2000; Tucker, 1997; Weisburg et al., 2009).  Since 
it is more difficult to fire a principal in the public sector, we expect that a centralized official will 
reduce their autonomy in order to limit negative outcomes for students.  Furthermore, since 
school principals in the public sector are more likely to have an incentive to maximize budgets, 
we expect that central offices will not grant them much autonomy over finance decisions 
(Niskanen, 1971). 
Data 
The data for the public and private school principals comes from the School and Staffing 
Survey (SASS) 2011-2012 questionnaire.  SASS was developed by the National Center for 
Education Statistics (NCES) and it has been administered seven times since 1987-88 to 2011-
2012. Table 1 lists the question categories and what they measure1. The public school principal 
data file contained 7,510 records while the private school principal data file contained 1,720 
                                                     
1 For more information, see 
http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass/pdf/1112/SASS2A.pdf (for public school principals) and 
http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass/pdf/1112/SASS2B.pdf (for private school principals). 
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records. There were some additional questions for public school principals, but in this paper, we 
compare only the common questions related to decision making. 
Our dependent variables come from questions 16-A through 16-G on decision-making in 
SASS 2011-2012.  These variables measure the influence principals perceive to have on setting 
performance standards, establishing curriculum, determining content for professional 
development, evaluating teachers, hiring teachers, setting discipline policy, and deciding how the 
budget will be spent.  This section asks the principals to rate their ability to influence seven 
school related activities on a four-item Likert scale (no influence, minor influence, moderate 
influence and major influence) and it includes a not applicable option for each activity (Table 1).  
[Table 1 about here] 
 We utilize questions from the survey that relate to principal’s demographics, academic 
and professional background for summary statistics. Tables 2A and 2B show the population 
weighted summary statistics expressed as percentages for the principals in public and private 
schools.  Overall, private school principals report more years of principal experience but lower 
education levels in comparison to the public school principals.  This is consistent with the 
findings of Hill et al. (2016).  The proportion of private school principals reporting greater than 
10 years of experience as a principal or school head is almost double that of public school 
principals. The proportion of private school principals involved in teaching in addition to their 
task as a principal or school head is also about twice that for public school principals.  
A higher proportion of public school principals report having previous experience as a 
department head, assistant principal or program director and participation in a school training or 
development program in comparison to their private counterparts.  The proportion of public 
school principals holding a school administration license is about twice as large as private school 
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principals. Almost all public school principals earned a MA or higher degree while only 76% of 
the private school principals report so. The racial composition of principals is largely white in 
both the sectors (86% in public schools and 90% in private schools; this excludes mixed race, so 
it is a lower bound). Lastly, private schools have a larger share of females in their leadership in 
comparison to the public schools. 
[Table 2A about here] 
[Table 2B about here] 
 We also report summary statistics on the percent of private and public school principals 
to report having a major influence on of the seven outcome categories in Table 3. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Methods 
Since the survey responses related to decision-making are ordinal and have four 
categories (from “No Influence” to “Major Influence”), the analytic technique we employ is an 
ordered logistic regression (Borooah, 2002; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003) of the form: 
Logit (Y) = ln (
𝜋
1−𝜋
) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒               Equation (1) 
Therefore: 
𝜋 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑌 = 𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒, 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒)         Equation (2) 
𝜋 =
𝑒𝛼+𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒
1 + 𝑒𝛼+𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒
 
The dependent variable of interest is the reported decision-making ability of a given 
principal, i, for the following school-level activities: setting student performance standards, 
establishing curriculum, determining teacher professional development content, evaluating 
teachers, hiring new full-time teachers, setting discipline policy and deciding how the budget 
will be spent.  This variable takes the value 1 for the least influence and value 4 for the highest 
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influence.2  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 is a dummy variable of value 1 if the principal is in a private school, and 0 
if the principal is in a public school.  The coefficient of interest, 𝛽1, measures the mean 
difference of the decision-making influence reported by private school principals relative to 
public school principals.  The odds ratio,𝜋, is the likelihood for private school principals, relative 
to public school principals, to report having a major influence on a given school-level activity. 
Since we want to examine the differences between principals based solely on the type of 
institution they are in, this initial model does not control for any principal or school-level 
differences.  In order to construct a conservative estimate of the association between institution-
type and decision-making freedom, we construct the following model that also includes school 
and principal characteristics as controls: 
Logit (Y) = ln (
𝜋
1−𝜋
) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑋                    Equation (1) 
Therefore: 
𝜋 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑌 = 𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒, 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝑋 = 𝑥)         Equation (2) 
𝜋 =
𝑒𝛼+𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒+𝛽2X
1 + 𝑒𝛼+𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒+𝛽2X
 
𝑋 is a vector of controls which includes the following principal characteristics: race, 
gender, education level, years of experience as a principal or school head, years of experience as 
a teacher in elementary or secondary school, any experience as a department head, any 
experience as an assistant principal, participation in professional development or training 
programs, management experience outside of education, and whether the principle holds a 
license in school administration.  Vector X also includes these school-level characteristics: 
school size, school level, number of full-time teachers, student/teacher ratio, percent of minority 
                                                     
2 Since the dependent variable is ordinal, we use ordered logit regression and report average marginal effects for 
the likelihood of reporting “major influence.” 
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teachers, and percent of minority students.  This second model includes school and principal 
level controls in order to examine if the effects are significant after accounting for differences in 
the types of schools and principals hired across the two institutions. 
The restricted use data provided by the NCES are imputed and adjusted for non-response. 
Based on the stratified probability proportionate to size (PPS) sampling strategy used by NCES 
in the SASS, we use the balance repeated replication (BRR) bootstrap methodology3 so that the 
results reflect the true population values and not just the sampled units.  This methodology does 
not change our final estimates, but rather corrects the formula for the calculation of the standard 
errors. 
Results 
We now present the results for our models with and without controls in Table 4.  The first 
row presents results without any controls, the second includes principal-level controls, and the 
third includes all school and principal-level controls.  The results are robust across models; 
however, the model without controls only finds statistical significance for the first four 
categories.   
The model with all controls indicates that private school principals are more likely to 
report having a major influence on 6 out of 7 types of school decisions.  When controlling for 
school and principal-level differences across sectors, we find evidence that private school 
principals exercise significantly more influence over decision-making activities.  In particular, 
private school principals have a higher likelihood of reporting to have a major influence over 
performance standards, curriculum, professional development, hiring teachers, discipline policy, 
and budget decisions.  However, private schools principals have a 3.9 percentage point, or 4.1 
                                                     
3 Details can be found in the User’s Manual for the 2011–12 Schools and Staffing Survey: 
https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass/methods0708.asp 
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percent, lower likelihood of reporting to have a major influence on the evaluation of teachers.  
Since private school principals have a 4.9-percentage point higher likelihood of having a major 
influence over the hiring of teachers, they may not need to provide as much direct feedback.  In 
addition, since private school principals have a 14.4-percentage point, or 20.7 percent, higher 
likelihood of having a major influence on the content of their teacher professional development 
programs, they may provide feedback through that channel instead.  Notably, private school 
principals have a 20-percentage point, or 47 percent, higher likelihood of reporting that they have 
a major influence on establishing their school’s curriculum.  Furthermore, private school 
principals have a 14-percentage point, or 19 percent, higher likelihood of reporting that they have 
a major influence on their students’ performance standards.  This may be especially important 
for the ability of the principal to positively impact student achievement. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 Based on our results, we expect that the reduced regulatory burden found in private 
schools grants the principals the ability to exercise more influence related to school activities in 
comparison to public school principals. To explore our analysis further, we examine the 
coefficients on the control variables for our preferred model, found in Table 5.  
[Table 5 about here] 
 Most of our school-level controls are unrelated to the seven outcome measures of 
interest; however, some statistical significance emerges.  Principals within larger schools are 
more likely to report having a major influence on performance standards, but less likely to report 
so for establishing curriculum.  Principals in secondary schools are more likely to report having a 
major influence in performance standards and curriculum, but less likely to report having 
influence over discipline and budget decisions.  Being in a school with a more diverse set of 
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teachers is associated with a higher likelihood of reporting a major influence on performance 
standards and curriculum. 
 The coefficient on the principal’s previous experience as a department head is significant 
and positive in all cases except for the case of teacher evaluation, where it is not statistically 
different from zero. Hence, previous leadership experience has a systematic positive relationship 
with the principal’s ability to influence school level activities.  Lower levels of previous 
principal experience and previous teaching experience are associated with a lower likelihood of 
reporting to have an influence on most categories. 
Having a master’s or higher degree appears to be a positive principal characteristic.  It 
could be that education itself improves decision-making ability or that people that choose to 
pursue more education are also more motivated and confident.  The coefficient on female is 
positive throughout and statistically significant for three of the seven activities. Females seem to 
have systematic advantages over males in their influence over school-related activities, even 
after controlling for background and types of school.  Since about three-fourths of all elementary 
and secondary-level teachers are female, female principals may be more able to have a strong 
connection with their employees (Goldring et al., 2013).  Minority principals have a lower 
likelihood of reporting that they have an influence over hiring teachers and setting discipline 
policy, but a higher likelihood of reporting that they have an influence over student performance 
standards and curriculum. 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The principals in both sectors differ significantly in decision-making abilities when it 
comes to their influence on school-level activities. The private school principals may have an 
advantage over their public school counterparts by having significantly more influence on almost 
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all the school related activities. Principal characteristics, like previous experience as a 
department head and having a Masters or higher degree, play a positive role in their ability to 
exercise higher influence on school activities. Nevertheless, the private school sector may be 
able to learn from the public school sector in evaluating teachers.  Female principals appear to 
have a systematic advantage over their male counterparts in reporting more decision-making 
influence related to school activities. 
 In terms of policy implications, private school principals report to have more autonomy 
than public school principals on every aspect of decision-making ability except the evaluation of 
teachers. These findings may point towards the need of training in evaluation activities for the 
private sector.  However, it could mean that the private school sector has a lower need for direct 
teacher feedback since they have more autonomy in hiring decisions and more involvement in 
the schools, as Chubb and Moe (1988) find.  If principal autonomy is associated with enhanced 
educational experiences for children, and the private sector allows for more decision-making 
freedom, we should increase access to private school choice.  However, these policy decisions 
would benefit substantially from additional research linking principal autonomy to student-level 
outcomes. 
Our results may also reflect the emphasis that recent Race to the Top related policy 
changes have imposed on traditional public schools (Maranto et al., 2016).  Ouchi (2009) has 
emphasized the importance of principal autonomy and argued that principals know what happens 
at the school-level while central office employees do not. Perhaps, the relatively short tenure but 
greater credentialing of public school principals, as well as larger school size may suggest that 
they are climbers; that is, they see the principal position as a stepping-stone to the 
superintendence and focus on pleasing superiors rather than serving kids (Downs, 1967; Maranto 
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et al., 2016). Cheng (2015) finds that schools where principals have more autonomy over 
personnel have greater mission coherence, though his sample only includes public schools. 
 Since we have relied on self-reported measures in school surveys, the results are prone to 
social desirability bias as well as reference group bias (Dobbie & Fryer, 2015; West et al., 2015). 
Although SASS is a nationally representative sample and stable results over time can have good 
external validity, future studies should utilize other measures like value-added measures related 
to school’s graduation rates and teacher turnover to study principal’s leadership qualities.   
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Table 1: School-Related Activities over Which the Principal Has Influence 
Category School-related activities 
A Setting performance standards for students of this school 
B Establishing curriculum at this school 
C Determining the content of in-service professional development programs for 
teachers of this school 
D Evaluating teachers of this school 
E Hiring new full-time teachers of this school 
F Setting discipline policy at this school 
G Deciding how your school budget will be spent 
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Table 2A: Summary Statistics for Principal Characteristics 
Measure Public Private 
Years principal or school head at this or any school prior to this year   
no experience 8.32 8.78 
low experience 1-3 24.55 18.82 
medium experience 4-10 43.79 30.97 
high experience 10+ 23.34 41.43 
Years principal or school head at this school prior to this year   
no experience 16.46 14.52 
low experience 1-3 38.83 27.62 
medium experience 4-10 36.07 32.92 
high experience 10+ 8.64 24.94 
Years of elementary or secondary teaching before becoming principal or school head   
no experience 1.70 18.51 
low experience 1-3 2.79 7.99 
medium experience 4-10 47.34 32.79 
high experience 10+ 48.16 40.71 
Years of elementary or secondary teaching since becoming principal or school head   
no experience 90.41 49.69 
low experience 1-3 5.42 21.87 
medium experience 4-10 3.30 15.87 
high experience 10+ 0.87 12.56 
Currently teaching at school 37.37 71.89 
            Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each italicized category.
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Table 2B: Summary Statistics for Principal Characteristics 
Measure Public Private 
Prior to becoming a principal of school head   
Worked as department head 40.36 35.33 
Worked as an assistant principal or program director 73.85 43.82 
Participated in school training or development program 55.34 31.41 
Previous management experience outside education 40.28 46.43 
Currently holding license in school administration 95.99 43.36 
Having a bachelor’s degree 99.94 88.47 
Bachelor degree awarded by a university’s department or college of education 81.93 67.78 
Having a master’s degree 97.61 76.34 
Master’s degree awarded by a university’s department or college of education 97.36 85.38 
Earned a MA and higher degree 97.82 68.96 
Participated in any professional development activity related to principal or school head in last 12 months 99.32 89.56 
Race (white) 86.36 90.19 
Gender (male) 48.38 44.64 
N 7,510 1,720 
        Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each category. 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Principals’ Self-Reported Major Influence on Outcome Variables 
Measure Public Private 
Performance Standards 73.32 80.37 
Establishing Curriculum 42.63 69.07 
Professional Development 69.49 74.21 
Teacher Evaluation 95.34 82.01 
Hiring Teachers 84.33 83.73 
Discipline Policy 79.40 81.54 
Budget Spending 63.79 62.06 
N 7,510 1,720 
      Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each category. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Results Based on Model Used 
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects of private on the “major influence” category, estimated after running ordered logit 
models. Demographic variables, academic training, professional development and educational attainment levels are included as 
controls. Estimates use balanced repeated replication (BRR) bootstrap population weights. Standard errors in parentheses.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
Performance 
Standards 
Establishing 
Curriculum 
Professional 
Development 
Teacher 
Evaluation 
Hiring 
Teachers 
Discipline 
Policy 
Budget 
Spending 
No Controls 0.072*** 0.247*** 0.126*** -0.064*** 0.019 0.018 0.001 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) 
        
Principal Controls 0.146*** 0.259*** 0.141*** -0.034*** 0.050*** 0.060*** 0.049** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.009) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021) 
        
Principal and School Controls 0.140*** 0.200*** 0.144*** -0.039*** 0.049*** 0.067*** 0.071*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.009) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021) 
        
Observations 9,230 9,230 9,230 9,230 9,230 9,230 9,230 
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Table 5: Likelihood of Reporting Major Influence (All Controls) 
  
Performance 
Standards 
Establishing 
Curriculum 
Professional 
Development 
Teacher 
Evaluation 
Hiring 
Teachers 
Discipline 
Policy 
Budget 
Spending 
Private School Principal 0.140*** 0.200*** 0.144*** -0.039*** 0.049*** 0.067*** 0.071*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.009) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021) 
School Size 0.009* -0.011* 0.009 0.000 0.004 0.007 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) 
School Level 0.018* 0.073*** 0.017 -0.003 -0.001 -0.017** -0.044*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) 
Number of Full Time Teachers  -0.000 -0.001** -0.001* -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Student/Teacher Ratio -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Teacher Diversity  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Minority Students  -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Low principal Experience -0.060** -0.053** 0.037 -0.001 0.015 -0.085*** -0.095*** 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.029) (0.016) (0.022) (0.026) (0.023) 
Low Teaching Experience -0.042 -0.064 0.069 -0.034** -0.050* -0.049* 0.028 
 (0.035) (0.040) (0.076) (0.016) (0.029) (0.029) (0.043) 
Department Head 0.034*** 0.052*** 0.039*** 0.003 0.034*** 0.024** 0.041*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.005) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) 
Assistant Principal/Program Director -0.027* -0.046*** 0.001 -0.004 0.007 -0.029* 0.032** 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) 
School Training/ Development 0.044*** 0.015 0.018* 0.007 -0.006 0.015 0.016 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) 
License in School Administration 0.045** 0.032 0.022 0.031*** 0.004 0.037* 0.019 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.009) (0.013) (0.020) (0.031) 
Management Experience  0.005 0.012 -0.023* 0.002 0.001 0.017 -0.006 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) 
Master’s Degree or Higher 0.062** -0.004 -0.024 0.007 0.035* 0.051* 0.075** 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.047) (0.011) (0.019) (0.027) (0.033) 
Professional Development 0.146*** 0.148*** 0.034 0.019 0.059 0.054 0.076 
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Notes: Table reports average marginal effects for the “major influence” category, estimated after running ordered logit models. 
Estimates use balanced repeated replication (BRR) bootstrap population weights.  Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
(0.046) (0.057) (0.126) (0.020) (0.056) (0.036) (0.062) 
White -0.006 -0.041* 0.010 0.002 0.035** 0.051*** 0.020 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.019) (0.009) (0.015) (0.016) (0.021) 
Female 0.022 0.022 0.052*** 0.020*** 0.015 0.015 0.034** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) 
Observations 9,230 9,230 9,230 9,230 9,230 9,230 9,230 
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